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1 Introduction
This paper investigates whether the regulation of insider trading or insider trading
laws can be effective.1 Following Henry Manne's publication of Insider Trading and the
Stock Market, the debate surrounding the question of insider trading and whether or not it
should be regulated has received a lot of attention from lawyers, economists, and
financiers and a prolific literature has ensued. One particular aspect of the debate was
centered on the question of whether the regulation of insider trading or insider trading
laws are effective. Indeed, with the evolution of insider trading laws, students of insider
trading laws have attempted to see whether these laws are effective in discouraging
insiders from trading on non-public information. Whether they focus on insider trading in
general or insider trading around particular corporate events, by and large, the consensus

1

We use the standard definition of insider trading adopted in the literature, which is the use of material

nonpublic information about a corporation in a securities transaction. Insiders are traditionally defined as
any individual who has access or has been given access to inside information. The American legislation
uses the same definition of insider trading. However, it introduces a distinction within the class of insiders
by differentiating registered (inside) insiders from (unregistered) outside insiders (tippees). Registered
insiders (or corporate insiders) are defined by the Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as
every director and officer of the corporation plus any owners of more than 10% of the corporation's equity.
They are required by the Section 16(a) to report periodically all their trade in equity securities to the SEC.
Unregistered insiders (or outside-insiders) are also in possession of material nonpublic information but are
not required to report their transactions to the SEC. Unregistered insiders' acquisition of inside information
can be direct in the course of their work (investment bankers, lawyers, risk arbitragers, accountants,
financial printers) or indirect by the intermediary of registered insiders (tippees).
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was almost unanimous: insider trading laws are ineffective, they are unsuccessful in
deterring insiders from trading on non-public information.
Although these empirical studies reveal very informative and can provide interesting
and illustrative evidence regarding the ineffectiveness of regulation, these studies are not
useful if one wants to make a case against the government-enforced regulation of insider
trading based on its effectiveness simply because none of these studies investigate the
causes of such ineffectiveness. Actually, the only conclusion that one can derive from
this empirical literature is that government regulation of insider trading is ineffective.
However, the fact that the empirical literature shows that government regulation of
insider trading has been so far ineffective cannot be interpreted as showing that
government regulation cannot be effective and, therefore, should be repealed.
Another problem is that, even outside the empirical literature, almost no systematic
research on this issue has been conducted.2 Therefore, the contribution of this paper is to
fill that gap. In this paper, we will investigate whether regulation can be effective in
deterring insiders from trading on inside information.3 We will show in this paper that
there is a theoretical as well as practical impossibility for government regulation of
insider trading to be effective in deterring insiders from trading on inside information.
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An exception is Matthew Spiegel and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, The Efficacy of Insider Trading

Regulation, Working Paper 257, Berkeley, University of California, Institute of Business and Economic
Research (1995). However, we shall see, their argument is incomplete.
3

Another justification for investigating whether insider trading regulation can be effective is the fact that

most advocates of insider trading regulation by and large seem to assume cannot fail. See Jhinyoung Shin,
The Optimal Regulation of Insider Trading, 5 J. Fin. Econ. 49 (1996) and Arturo Bris, Do Insider Trading
Laws Work? Yale ICF Working Paper No. 00-19, 2 n. 4 (2000).

4

First, we discuss whether the regulation of insider trading can be effective. Second,
we will show to what extend our analysis is consistent with the empirical literature.
Finally, we will offer some concluding remarks.
2 Can the regulation of insider trading effective?
In this section, we investigate whether regulation can be effective in deterring
insiders from trading on inside information. We show in this section that there is a
theoretical as well as practical impossibility for government regulation of insider trading
to be effective in deterring insiders from trading on inside information.
2.1 Intangibility, First Accessing Person, and Information Network
In order to understand the problems faced by the regulator, we need to understand
insider trading laws' main objective. The regulation of insider trading prohibits insiders
from using inside information in securities transaction decisions. In other words, the main
objective of the regulator is to prevent nonpublic information from circulating in the
stock markets. In attempting to do so, the regulator faces various problems that are
related to the nature of the good which he or she attempts to control: information.
The first problem the regulatory authority must face is that information is an
intangible good. Therefore, compared to a physical good, no physical barrier can prevent
it from flowing and circulating. It can be argued that information can be prevented from
circulating or even being used as soon as it has been embodied in a piece of paper such as
a note or a memorandum. Therefore, the argument goes, the insider who has access to the
materialized information and could trade on it is going to refrain from doing so because
she would be under greater scrutiny.
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While this might be true, the regulator will still be confronted with an additional
problem. Even if the insider refrains from trading on inside information, nothing prevents
her from communicating it to a third party. To circulate, there is no need for the
information to be under a tangible form. As soon as the insider has access to the
information, there is no way to know whether she has communicated what she knows to a
third party insofar as she did not transmit the information in its materialized aspect. In
other words, the regulator faces a "first accessing person" problem, that is, there is
always a first person who has access to the information. As a consequence, even if this
person is under great scrutiny, the regulator is confronted with an additional problem. He
cannot prevent this person from communicating this information to a third party except
by prohibiting this person from accessing the information, which is impossible because
that would mean prohibiting her from performing her job.
This problem of a first accessing person aggravates when there is more than one
person with access to the information. In the corporation, more than a few people have
access to inside information; there is a myriad of individuals who come across
confidential information on a regular basis in the course of their duties. Moreover, some
of these individuals are not directly employed by the corporation; they work on a
temporary basis for the corporation and yet have access to inside information.4 As the
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See, for example, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642

(1997), and United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) cases, where the persons charged in
violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Exchange Commission
10b-5 were not directly employed by the corporation where the confidential information had been
produced.
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number of people accessing confidential information increases, the number of third
parties with access to information increases as well.
Moreover, the regulator's problem does not stop at the level of third parties. Third
parties can also communicate the indirectly acquired information to other parties which
themselves can communicate this information to other parties.5 The network by which the
information circulates can become very complex and the higher the degree of complexity
of the network, the greater the difficulty for the regulator to prevent the information from
circulating. Also the regulator will have problems tracing back the information to its
source. This latter condition is necessary if the regulatory authority wants to eliminate
illegal insider trading and deter individuals from trading on the basis of inside
information. The effectiveness of a regulation relies upon its effectiveness to prevent first
accessing individuals from communicating inside information to third parties. In other
words, to be effective the regulation of insider trading must attack the problem at its
source, that is, the first individuals who have access to inside information.
Finally, the more complex the network through which the information flows, the
more distorted the information is going to be. In other words, because individuals have
different interpretation and different ways of communicating the information, the

5

Sometimes, they may communicate the information even without knowing they are doing so. The author

would like to thank Professor Steven Call for drawing his attention to this point. See, for example, SEC v.
Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984): George Platt, Phoenix's CEO and, therefore, an insider in
regard to Phoenix, discussing with his wife about a recent business trip to New York at a track meet,
inadvertently communicated inside information to Coach Switzer who laid down a on a row of bleachers
behind them; inside information that he later used to buy a substantial number of Phoenix shares and tipped
off a number of his friends.
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information progressing through the network is going to be subject to transformations.
The further the information goes into the network, the more likely the information is
going to be different from its original form. As a consequence, even if the regulator has
been able to detect a potential illegal transaction based on inside information, he still has
to identify what the inside information is on which the potential malefactor has based her
transaction.
The problem we have just discussed is not totally new. Our analysis is reminiscent of
the analysis that we find in the economics of prohibition and the consequences that
prohibition entails, that is, the emergence of illegal parallel, or black, markets as a
mechanism to circumvent the regulation. Manne already described this phenomenon of
illegal markets for inside information.6
We now turn to another problem the regulator must face: the inefficacy of the
mechanism of detection for illegal insider trading. This problem is also due to the
intangible nature of non-public information.
2.2 Circumstantial Evidence, Subjectivism, and Strategic Behaviors
Meulbroek (1992) explains that regulatory authorities (such as the SEC) use a
multipronged strategy to detect and prosecute illegal insider trading.7 The first source
comes from individuals informing on other people. The other source relies upon tangible
evidence ("a smoking gun") such as notes, memoranda, or telephone conversations which
indicate that an investor traded on the basis of inside information. The last strategy relies
on circumstantial, or statistical, evidence to detect and prosecute insiders.
6

See Henry Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market 59-75 (1966).
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See Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. Fin. 1661 (1992)
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The SEC usually lacks hard evidence due to the intangible nature of inside
information. As a consequence, it relies often only on circumstantial evidence to detect
and prosecute illegal insider trading.8,9 The use of circumstantial evidence, that is, of
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Id. at 1680. Meulbroek also documents that 41% of all insider trading investigations are triggered on the

basis of information provided by informants. In the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act
of 1988 (See Insider Trading and Securities Enforcement Act of 1988, November 19, 1988, P.L. 100-704,
Sec 21A (e), H.R. 5133.), the Congress gives authority to the SEC to award bounties to informants who
provides information leading to the recovery of a civil penalty from an insider, from a person who tipped
information to an insider, or from a person who controlled directly or indirectly an insider. Moreover, this
bounty program allows the SEC to give up to 10% of the civil penalty recovered by the SEC or the
Attorney General. While the SEC does rely also on such a mechanism to prosecute insider trading, there is
no empirical available evidence that such a program has leaded to an increase in the number of successful
indictments or a decrease in insider trading. It is also difficult to appreciate to what extent such a program
can be effective in deterring insider trading insofar as one principal consequence of such a program is that
most of the informants will use such a mechanism in order to pursue a different goal mainly related to
revenge or envy in the same way that tax evasion investigations are triggered on information provided by
angry wives or jealous neighbors. It is therefore difficult to asses the effectiveness of such a mechanism.
9

SEC John Chad made at several occasions clear that many insider trading prosecutions rely on statistical

evidence. For example, when asked during the 1983 Congressional Hearings whether the SEC could have
successfully prosecuted a particular case if the standard of proof for an insider trading conviction was
raised, he answer "it would be difficult, because that case, like most of these cases, was built on
circumstantial evidence" (Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation. Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance. 98th Congress. First Session on
H.R. 559. April 13, 1983. Serial Number 98-33: p. 61.) Another example comes from a SEC memorandum
from Office of the General Counsel to Chairman John Shad (1983), in the SEC expresses its concern about
the idea of raising the burden of proof to a higher level:

9

"unusual price movements on insider trading days," poses several problems that
undermine the effectiveness of the regulation itself.10 Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1995)
develop an interesting model to explain "why the SEC cannot effectively use statistical

"…. the burden of proof in Commission injunctive actions is proof by preponderance of evidence.
Commentators have suggested that in light of the possibility of a judge imposing a higher sanction, a higher
burden of proof should be required in actions seeking the proposed civil penalty.
On the other hand it should be noted that the proof in many of the Commission's insider trading cases
depends heavily on circumstantial evidence. A higher burden of proof, such as a clear and convincing
standard, would make it more difficult for the Commission to prove its case, particularly in insider trading
cases where most cases are built on circumstantial evidence."
Examples of recent cases based on circumstantial evidence brought by the SEC and in which courts
accept circumstantial evidence as an appropriate means in proving insider trading in SEC fraud cases are:
US v. Mylett. Docket No. 96-1309, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 97F.3d 663;
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 26113; Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) p. 99, 326, 1996; SEC v. Warde. Docket No. 966190. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 151. F.3d 42; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 15991;
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) p. 90, 239; 49 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 1131 (1998); SEC v. Sargent. No.
00-1293. United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 229 F.3d 68; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 25273.
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91, 244.55 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 1103. 2000; United States SEC v.
Ginsburg. Case No. 99-8694-CIV-RYSKAMP/ VITUNAC. United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. West Palm Beach Division.242 F. Supp. 2d 1310; 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25292. 2002;
and SEC v. Franco. 01 Civ. 3872(JGK). United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
2003. A research on LexisNexis Academic showed that 168 Federal and State Cases have been prosecuted
under the basis of circumstantial evidence in the last ten years, 129 in the last five years, 48 in the last two
years, 20 in the last year.
10

Meulbroek, supra note 7, at 1689.
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information to identify and deter corporate insiders who may trade on material, nonpublic information."11
Before entering the details of their analysis, it is necessary to briefly explain how a
mechanism to detect and prosecute insiders relying upon circumstantial evidence works.
They describe the functioning of the mechanism as follows:
First, the RA [regulatory authority] establishes a rule, which stipulates that if a
certain random variable (e.g., the price move during a trading day) exceeds a certain
exogenous threshold, and the trader in question has traded during the day, he will be
prosecuted for illegal insider trading. Second, investors obtain information and trade.
Third, the RA observes the size of each investor's trade and the transaction price. The
RA also observes any subsequent price changes. … Based upon these observations,
and the rule established in the first stage, the RA determines whether or not to
prosecute particular individuals.12

In other words, if the trading volume of a trader is "abnormal" in comparison to his
usual trading volume, if the timing of his transaction is "suspect" regarding the disclosure
of a material information, or if the transaction took place prior to a significant subsequent
price movement; therefore, the regulatory authority will consider that such a transaction
has been realized on the basis of inside information.
Most of Spiegel and Subrahmanyam's argument is largely inspired by Lucas's work
on rational expectations and his criticism of econometric models that neglect the effect of
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Spiegel and Subrahmanyam, supra note 2.
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Id. at 9-10.
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agents' rational reaction to anticipated future macroeconomic policy decisions.13 When
trying to detect and prosecute insiders using circumstantial evidence, the regulatory
authority is faced with a major problem. Once the rule used by the regulator to detect and
prosecute insiders becomes known to insiders, the insiders possessing the most accurate
information are going to modify strategically their behavior to avoid investigations.14 In
other words, knowing that the regulator's rule to trigger an investigation is based on price
movement during a trading day exceeding a certain threshold, insiders possessing
confidential information, being the most able to make more accurate estimates regarding
future stock prices, are also going to be the most able to predict when the regulator is
going to suspect that non-public information has been circulating and insider trading took
place. Insiders with more accurate confidential information are, consequently, going to
rationally adapt their trading strategy in order to avoid the stock prices reaching the
threshold above which the regulator will start investigating insiders' transactions.
Therefore, the argument goes, the individuals with less accurate information – being less
capable to predict the magnitude of the stock price changes resulting from their
transactions – will be more likely to trigger the investigations and be prosecuted on the
basis of circumstantial evidence. In other words, when the regulation of insider trading
relies on statistical evidence to detect and prosecute insider trading, as it is mostly the
case today, the population of individuals who are going to be prosecuted will consist
essentially of people who have traded on the basis of immaterial information. In

13

See Robert E. Lucas, Econometric Policy Evaluations: A Critique. 1 Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public

Policy 19 (1976).
14

Spiegel and Subrahmanyam, supra note 2, at 27.
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conclusion, insider trading regulation cannot be effective. It does not discourage insiders
in possession of non-public material information from trading since the quality of
information they possess makes it unlikely they will be detected and prosecuted.15
There is no doubt that Spiegel and Subrahmanyam provided us with a very powerful
model explaining why regulation of insider trading cannot be effective in discouraging
insiders from trading on material non-public information. However, there are at least two
additional considerations that should be taken into account when explaining the
ineffectiveness of a regulation relying upon circumstantial evidence to detect and
prosecute insider trading.
First, although the literature tends to focus on the active aspect of insider trading –
trading on the basis of inside information – from a technical point of view, insider trading
can also take a passive form. Insider trading does not automatically imply that a securities
transaction occurs. An insider trading takes place when an individual has used of
information not available to the public to make a decision regarding a securities
transaction. In other words, if an individual in possession of inside information decides to
cancel a securities transaction, that is, not buy or sell stocks, technically, she is also liable
for illegal insider trading since her decision was made on the basis of inside information.
Put differently, if an individual either has avoided a loss or has realized a profit by not
realizing a securities transaction and her decision was determined on her having nonpublicmaterial information , she has committed an insider trading.
Because there is no trading involved even though there is decision, this type of insider
trading cannot be detected. Since the regulator relies mostly on statistical evidence

15

Id. at 21.
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(observation of stock price changes) to detect and infer whether insider trading occurred,
it is impossible for him to detect this form of insider trading for the reason that such
activity simply does not involve stock price changes per se.
Another issue that deserves attention when discussing the effectiveness of regulation
relying on circumstantial evidence to detect and prosecute insider trading is that
information as well as inside information do not have any objectivepredictive power or
objective value. Holding particular information regarding a particular corporate event
does not give an individual the ability to predict with certainty the direction or magnitude
of future stock price changes. Information is always subject to individuals' subjective
interpretations, which vary with individuals' experiences and knowledge.16 Therefore,
when individuals use information (public or not) in profit-seeking decisions, the success
of their decisions does depend of the direction and magnitude of price changes. However,
the latter depend on whether or not market participants interpreted the same information
as they did. In other words, while insiders have technically an informational advantage by
holding information not yet available to the public when they are making their decision,
the success of their expectations is ultimately conditional upon the other market
participants' interpretations regarding the information and resulting expectations once the
non-public information has been disclosed to them. Therefore, an insider may make a
transaction on the basis of inside information expecting that market participants are going
16

See, for example, Ludwig M. Lachmann, Professor Shackle on Economic Significance of Time, 11

Metroeconomica (April/August 1959) rep. in Ludwig M. Lachmann, Capital, Expectations, and the Market
Process: Essays on the Theory of the Market Economy at 81-93 (1977), Ludwig M. Lachmann, From Mises
to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic Society, 14 J.l Econ. Lit. 54 (1976), and
Ludwig M. Lachmann, The Market as an Economic Process (1986).
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to react in a particular way once the information is disclosed but it is possible that market
participants are not going to react in the expected way.17 As a result, instead of realizing a
profit or avoiding a loss as expected, the insider may perfectly realize the opposite.
The fact that information is a subjective concept and the outcome of insider's decision
depends on other market participants' interpretation and resulting decisions is also an
obstacle to the effectiveness of the regulation of insider trading. The resulting implication
is that, while the insider has broken the law, the regulator will not receive any signal that
could help him to infer that insider trading has occurred because insider's expectations
regarding the reaction of market participants to the disclosure of the information were
inaccurate.

17

One could argue that, while in theory our argument is true, everybody in practice as the same

interpretation of the information. A typical example is that everybody will interpret a bad earnings report
the same way. Actually, this is not totally true in the sense that we mean by interpretation of the
information the reaction that the information is going to induce is the person who has access to it. The fact
that the firm has experimented bad earnings in the past year does not mean that everybody is going to sell
his shares. The reaction to a bad earnings report depends of whether shareholders interpret this bad earning
report as a signal that the firm is on the downward slope in terms of performance or it is just due to a bad
economic conjuncture. In the same way, a takeover announcement will not create the same reactions among
shareholders. Some of them may believe that it is the takeover for diversification purposes might be a bad
strategy. Others might believe that the takeover is just a mean for the acquiring management team to
increase its prestige, compensation packages, perks, and so on. It is in this sense that we argue that
information is always subject to individuals' subjective interpretation. See Ludwig M. Lachmann, An
Austrian Stocktaking: Unsettled Questions and Tentative Answers, in Louis M. Spadaro (Ed.), New
Directions in Austrian Economics, at 3-4 (1978).
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2.3 Strategic Behavior and Liquidity
In 1984, former SEC chairman, John Shad argued that the securities laws and, more
particularly, anti-insider trading laws were at the origin of the success of U.S. securities
markets:
Fifty years ago, in the depths of the depression, the nation's securities markets were
demoralized. Today, they are by far the best capital markets the world has ever
known – the broadest [the most liquid], the most active and efficient, and the fairest.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has played an important role in the
restoration of public confidence … [and] has discharged with distinction its mandate
to protect investors and maintain fair and orderly markets.18

Later, in his speech to the "SEC speaks" Conference, then-SEC chairman, Arthur
Levitt restated that the SEC through the regulation of insider trading played a key role in
the current success of American securities markets. He comments:
Our markets are a success precisely because they enjoy the world's highest level of
confidence. Investors put their capital to work – and put their fortunes at risk –
because they trust that the marketplace is honest. They know that our securities laws
require free, fair, and open transactions.19

It is therefore a quite accepted argument that the securities laws and, more
particularly, the regulation of insider trading has largely contributed to the success of the
18

See John Shad at 1 (1984) quoted in Amar Bhide, The Hidden costs of stock market liquidity, 34 J. Fin.

Econ. 31, 31 (1993).
19

See Arthur Levitt, A Question of Integrity: Promoting Investor Confidence by Fighting Insider Trading,

Remarks of Chairman Arthur Levitt to the "SEC speaks" Conference, Washington D.C. (1998).
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securities markets by restoring the investor confidence by guaranteeing that they are not
going to be "cheated by insiders".20 The theoretical literature tends also to argue that
prohibiting insider trading would increase liquidity and decrease the cost of equity.21 This
literature relies on the Akerlof's adverse-selection model to argue that the prohibition of
insider trading will increase liquidity and decrease the cost of equity.22 This literature
argues that, in presence of informed traders (insiders), risk-averse uninformed market
participants facing the uncertainty of trading with insiders will be reluctant to invest on
the market because they realize that they could be better off not trading. Therefore, this
literature argues, the liquidity of the market will decrease because there is less
participants on the market. This in turn poses another problem coming on the top of the
adverse selection problem posed by insider trading. In illiquid markets, investors will
have more difficulties to dispose of their securities on short notice. As a result, they will
ask a higher risk premium under the form of a higher return on equity and a lower buy
price to compensate the risks associated with illiquid markets and the possibility of
trading with insiders. These costs associated with insider trading and illiquid markets are
ultimately borne by the firms that see the costs of raising capital through issuing

20

Id. at 7. Now, while this point is beyond the scope of this paper, one might wonder what moral

implications and economic repercussions such statements by government officials may have with respect to
the public and investors once we realize that insider trading laws are ineffective.
21

See Lawrence R. Glosten, Insider Trading, Liquidity and the Role of the Monopolist, 62 bJ. Bus. 211

(1989); Utpal Bhattacharya and Matthew Spiegel. Insiders, Outsiders, and Market Breakdowns, 4 Rev. Fin.
Stud. 255 (1991).
22

See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality, Uncertainty, and the Market Mechanisms, 85

Q. J. Econ. 488 (1970).
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securities to the public increasing. Therefore, this literature concludes that, by prohibiting
insider trading, investors will be more willing to participate and will ask a lower risk
premium for the risks associated with insider trading, hence, this will lead to lower costs
of raising equity for firm and more liquid markets. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) also
provide empirical evidence showing that countries enforcing insider trading laws enjoy
greater level of liquidity and lower costs of equity than countries not enforcing insider
trading laws or not having insider trading laws.23
This latter fact offers another explanation why the regulation of insider trading cannot
be effective. The actual regulation has created the conditions for its ineffectiveness. It has
generated consequences that have modified the environment to which the regulation
originally applied. In particular, by increasing the market liquidity, the regulation has

23

See Utpal Bhattacharya and Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. Fin. 75 (2002).

However, it is important to emphasize that Bhattacharya and Daouk (at 104) are reluctant to attribute
causality between enforcement of insider trading laws and liquidity and cost of equity because the first
enforcement insider trading action is also related to an increase in country credit ratings. They therefore
consider that, while their findings are instructive, there should be also another unobservable causal variable,
namely, the attractiveness of the stock market to outside investors. There are also two factors not
emphasized by the authors that may explain why investors participate more. First, insider trading laws
create the illusion that there is no insider on the stock market to "cheat" the investors. Second, the rules
about publications of corporate information or, more recently, prohibitions about selected disclosure, create
the illusion that they are "equally informed." It is necessary to recall here that the original purpose of
insider trading laws has been to place investors on a "level playing field," that is, to place investors on an
equal footing for the access of information and for profit-making on the stock market. See, for example,
Council Directive 89/592/ECC of 13 November 1989, coordinating regulations on insider trading in
Europe. See also Arthur Levitt, supra note 19, at 2.
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given the ability to strategic insiders to better hide their informed trades. With more
liquid markets, insiders' trades become noisier and do not show up as fast as in illiquid
markets where volumes are small and unusual trades show up very fast.24 In other words,
the regulation of insider trading creates the "illusion" that there is no insider trading. As a
result, investors are going to participate more, believing that insiders are not going to take
advantage of them. With the liquidity of the stocks increasing, the impact of insiders'
informed trades are going to be diluted among investors' transactions and will not show
up as clearly as they would if stocks were illiquid. As a consequence, the regulatory
authority will not be able to distinguish informed trades among the large volume of
transactions realized on the markets and neither will they be able to observe abnormal
volume or price changes. The more liquid the markets are, the more ineffective the use of
circumstantial evidence to detect illegal insider trading is.
3 Can the regulation of insider trading be effective? The empirical evidence
In this section, we examine whether the empirical literature findings are consistent
with our previous analysis. As we will see, those studies are quite consistent with our
previous analysis at two levels. First, they do show that, in general, (corporate) insiders
refrain from trading around major corporate events because their transactions around
those events are under greater scrutiny. On the other hand, those studies also show that
insiders still make transactions based on non-public information around other corporate
events as they keep realizing abnormal profits. Second, as we will show below, some
studies show that there are some individuals other than registered insiders that have
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Bris, supra note 3, at 9.
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access to inside information and base their securities transactions on such information to
realize abnormal profits. The results of these studies tend to confirm our description of
information networks and also the fact that a large variety of individuals come across
inside information more or less incidentally.
There are two types of empirical study on insider trading regulation. The first type
focuses on the impact of regulation on illegal insider dealing in the aggregate. The second
kind focuses on insider trading around major corporate events such as takeover or
earnings announcements and analyzes the impact of regulation on insiders' trading
activity around these announcements.
Before discussing these studies, it is necessary to point the data on insider trading
used in these studies come from the SEC's monthly published Official Summary of
Insider Trading Transactions or the Ownership Reporting System (ORS) database
compiled by the SEC in which, corporate (registered) insiders' securities transactions are
reported and tracked as required by Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.25 As Meulbroek observes however, because insider trading based on inside
information is illegal, it is likely that these corporate insiders do not report their informed
transactions, which is problematic when it comes to measure the impact of regulation on
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See supra note 1 for a definition of corporate insiders. In the ORS database, each corporate insider filing

with the SEC is assigned an Insider Identifier Number. Once assigned, the SEC uses the Insider Identifier
Number to track all transactions of the insider. In the ORS database are also reported among other things
the nature of the ownership, the filer name and the nature of his relationship as an insider with the issuer,
the security name, the issuer name, the nature of the transaction, the transaction amount, and the transaction
price.
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illegal insider trading.26 Moreover, these studies usually do not take into account trading
by unregistered (outside) insiders because they are not required to report their
transactions to the SEC, which makes more difficult to identify their transactions.27
Therefore, while these studies as it will be shown offer interesting results, they largely
underestimate the volume of insider trading taking place on the stock exchanges because
they mostly focus on reported transactions by corporate insiders.
3.1 How Does Insider Trading Regulation Perform Overall?
The first type of study that we are going to discuss are studies that test how insider
trading regulation perform overall in discouraging insiders from trading on inside
information. Moreover, some of these studies test the impact of regulatory changes on the
trading of insiders. Their starting observation is that, when insiders trade securities in
their own firms, they are able to earn abnormal profits.28 This observation is in
contradiction with the strong version of the efficient market hypothesis version stating
that "security prices fully reflect all available information" and, accordingly, any
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and Thomas H. Eyssell. The Law and Finance of Corporate Insider Trading: Theory and Evidence 87-117
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Joseph E. Finnerty, Insiders and Market Efficiency, 31 J. Fin. 1141 (1976); H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders'
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systematic profit opportunities are precluded.29 Therefore, such a violation of the strong
version of the efficient market hypothesis implies that not all available information is
reflected in security prices, because, if it were, insiders would not be able to earn
abnormal returns.30 Suchability to better predict price movements and earn abnormal
returns can find its origin in the fact that insiders have access to and trade on the basis of
publicly unavailable information, which is not yet reflected in security prices.
In order to measure the effectiveness of insider trading laws, these studies
traditionally test two hypotheses. First, as sanctions on insider trading increase, we
should observe a reduction in insider trading as the expected net benefit (profitability) of
insider trading decreases. Second, assuming that regulatory changes have any impact on
insider's behaviors, we should also observe a reduction in the volume of insider
transactions, that is, the volume of shares traded. 31
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Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968). Put in simple terms,
such a theory argues that the "supply" of crime (in the present case, the amount of insider trading) is
negatively related to the expected costs of committing crimes (those expected costs depend mainly of the
probability of being caught and the amount of punishment incurred by the criminal if convicted). Given this
negative relationship, the theory predicts that the supply of crime will decrease if either the probability of
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Most of empirical studies assessing regulation effectiveness focus on the 1980s
because they are characterized by significant increases in the level of enforcement of
insider-trading regulations and sanctions against insider trading and, hence, are more
likely to affect insider's trading behaviors. As Haddock and Macey report "from January
22, 1982, through August, 29, 1986, the SEC initiated seventy-nine 10b-5 cases, an
average of 17.2 per year, which represents a more than sixfold increase in the rate of
enforcement".32 In addition, the percentage of cases brought against corporate insiders
alone went from 49 to 80 percent.
Seyhun developed a broad study over a period extending from 1975 to 1989
measuring "the effects of increases in the level and enforcement of insider-trading
regulation on corporate insiders".33 He examines open-market sales and purchases of
registered insiders in NYSE, AMEX, and OTC firms and the fifteen-year sample is
subdivided in three regulatory periods: the pre-Chiarella period (January 1975 – March
1980) during which the then-doctrine was the parity-of-information doctrine; pre-Insider

being caught or the amount of punishment increases. Therefore, when related to the issue of insider trading,
in theory, as insider trading laws have increased the sanctions against insider trading; we should observe a
reduction in supply of insider trading. Also, since given that regulatory authorities rely upon circumstantial
evidence to detect and prosecute insider trading, we should also anticipate a reduction in insider trading
volume as larger transaction volumes raise the probability of being detected and prosecuted for insider
trading.
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an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J. L. & Econ. 311, 333 (1987).
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See H. Nejat Seyhun, The Effectiveness of the Insider-Trading Sanctions, 35 J. L. & Econ. 149 (1992).
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Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA)34 period (April 1980 – August 1984) during which
the then-doctrine was the fiduciary-duty doctrine; and the post-ITSA period (September
1984 – December 1989), which is characterized by both an increased enforcement and
increased sanctions. Seyhun performs two sets of tests. First, he tests the effectiveness of
insider-trading sanctions in the aggregate. Second, he tests the effects of case law on
insider trading prior to earnings announcements and on insider trading prior to takeover
announcements.35
For the aggregate sample, Seyhun finds that the profitability of insider-trading
activity increased by 3.5 percent over the three periods. Contrary to theory's predictions,
insider trading is the most profitable during the period with the higher enforcement and
sanctions. For example, between 1984 and 1989, insiders' estimated average abnormal
profit, after twelve months, was 7 percent while, between 1975 and 1980, their estimated
average abnormal profit was 3.5 percent after twelve months.36 However, when insiders'
transactions are separated in purchases and sales over the three periods, Seyhun observes
that:
Overall, [the] evidence indicates that in the 1980s insiders have increasingly shifted
to a strategy of bailing out before bad news rather than buying on goods news.37

However, this evidence does not change the overall conclusion regarding insidertrading profitability. As a year-to-year analysis shows, "there are no measurable declines
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in either frequency or profitability of insider-trading activity immediately following
increases in the level of enforcement of insider-trading sanctions".38
Moreover, Seyhun tests the assumption that increases in enforcement and sanctions
reduce the volume of insider trading. Overall, Seyhun reaches the same conclusion as the
one regarding insider-trading profitability: "insiders have increased their trading activity
in the 1980s in spite of increased sanctions. The greater insider-trading activity appears to
mirror the growth in the market's overall trading volume. There is no evidence to suggest
that increased regulations deterred insiders from trading".39
Finally, Seyhun attempts to determine whether regulatory changes had a temporary
deterrent effect by examining potential changes in insider-trading activity around (i)
March 1980, when the Chiarella decision was announced; (ii) August 1984, when ITSA
was signed into law; and (iii) November 1988, when the Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA)40 was signed into law. The results show that "none of
the three events were associated with declines in insider-trading activity. Instead, data
suggest that insiders appeared not to be concerned with changes in statutes even on a
temporary basis".41
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3.2 Insider Trading around Major Corporate Events
Bettis, Ducan, and Harmon provide a survey of empirical studies analyzing insider
trading around major corporate events.42 These studies do not investigate the impact of
the regulations or regulatory changes on insider trading per se. Rather they study whether
or not insiders trade on inside information around major corporate events.
Traditionally, major corporate events are closely followed and monitored by
regulatory authorities such as the SEC because it is often around those events that major
transactions and price changes occur. More particularly, given that fighting insider
trading has become a major priority in SEC's agenda, we should expect that registered
insider transactions would be under greater scrutiny around those events. Therefore, if
insider trading laws were completely effective, insider activities around those events
would cease. 43
The empirical evidence reviewed by Bettis et al. shows that, despite regulation,
insiders continue to realize significant gains from nonpublic information. Not only do
insiders continue to purchase shares before "good news" and sell shares before "bad
news" but, actually, their trading volume has increased over time. The magnitude of
abnormal returns realized or losses avoided also show that insiders trade on the basis of
inside information.

42
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The preponderance of empirical evidence leads the authors to the conclusion that
"the legal and regulatory prohibitions have not been completely effective in preventing
insiders from trading using their inside information".44
There are other studies that expressly analyzed the impact of regulations, and in
particular, the increases of level and enforcement of prohibitions on insider trading
around major corporate events.
Performing a second set of tests, Seyhun analyzes the impact of case law on insiders'
trading prior earnings and takeover announcements.45 Looking at the impact of case law,
first, he examines "to which extent insiders exploit the upcoming earnings information
during the three subperiods".46 He examines insider-trading activity during the thirty days
preceding the earnings announcement day and whether the net number of transactions
was in the same direction as the earnings surprise. He observes a decrease in insiders'
exploitation of the upcoming earnings information through time. Prior to 1980, there was
timely insider-trading activity in 12 percent of earning announcements months while, in
the third period, timely insider-trading activity was in 9.3 percent of earning
announcements months. Moreover, it also appears that the timely net number of
transactions has also declined from an average of 0.29 transactions per month in the first
subperiod to 0.22 transactions per month in the third subperiod. Therefore, Seyhun
concludes that "in spite of the significant increases in insider-trading activity over time,
insiders in fact became more reluctant to engage in timely trading before earnings
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announcements during the third subperiod. This evidence suggests that case law provided
a measurable constraint on insider-trading activity immediately before earnings
announcements".47
He also investigates the impact of case law on insider trading prior to takeover
announcements.48 His findings are similar to those regarding insider-trading activity prior
to earnings announcements. He finds that insider purchase activity during thirty days
preceding the takeover announcement date falls from 14.5% to 7.1% over the three
regulatory periods. Interpreting these results, he concludes that, with the increasing
involvement of the courts, "insiders have become more and more reluctant to trade
immediately before takeover announcements".49
Arshadi and Eyssell provide a more enlightening study as their analysis investigates
the impact of regulatory changes on insider trading activity in target firms prior to tender
offers.50 Arshadi and Eyssell observe that the increase of stringent penalties and
enforcement activities by the SEC and the Department of Justice has significantly
affected the patterns of reported trading by registered insiders prior to tender offer
announcements.
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and Evidence 87-117 (1993). See also Nasser Arshadi and Thomas H. Eyssell, Regulatory Deterrence and
Registered Insider Trading: The Case of Tender Offers, 20 Financial Management, 30 (1991), for the
examination of the impact of the ITSA of 1984 on registered insider trading in target firms' shares. See
Appendix for more details.
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Their sample consists of 553 NYSE and AMEX firms that were targets of tender
offers between January 1, 1976, and December 31, 1990.51 They develop their sample by
examining each issue of the SEC News Digest published during the sample period and
retrieving all firms listed as targets in tender offer announcements filings. From this
sample, they eliminate 1) firms not on the 1990 CSRP daily returns tape, 2) self-tenders,
3) subsequent bids in multiple-bid contests, and 4) firms that were mentioned in either
The Wall Street Journal in a takeover-related context, or for which 13D filings were
announced in The Wall Street Journal in the 60-day period preceding the tender offer
announcement.52 Their study covers five regulatory periods, which are defined by five
major events in the history of insider trading legislation and prosecution. These five
major events are the Amendment of the Section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in the financial penalties and sanctions faced by insiders are increased (June 1975);
the amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the passage of the Rule
14e(3) prohibiting transactions based on non-public information about impending tender
offers by anyone inside or outside of the firms involved (September 1980) 53; the passage
of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (August 1984); the prosecutions of Dennis
Levine, Ivan Boesky, and Martin Siegel (May 1986); and the passage of the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (November 1988).
Analyzing transactions of registered insiders, Arshadi and Eyssell observe that the
volume of insider trading prior to tender offer announcement significantly fell over time
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and, particularly, after the passage of ITSA in 1984.54 In post-ITSA periods, registered
insiders are, on average, net sellers in periods immediately preceding tender offer
announcements while in pre-ITSA periods, they were, on average, net purchasers.
On the other hand, Arshadi and Eyssell observe that the cumulative average abnormal
returns (CAR) for the sample firms in each of the regulatory periods are not consistent
with the fact that registered insiders' preannouncement trading has dramatically declined
through time.55 They report that, by the announcement date, higher CAR (28.96% and
32.35%) are observed in periods of broader and more severe anti-insider trading
regulation (post-Levine et al. prosecutions and post-ITSFEA periods) in comparison with
periods of less regulation (respectively, 27.55% and 17.2% for the periods pre-ITSA).
Computing CAR over four intervals of event days before announcement day ((-10, -1), (5, -1), (-2, -1), and (0)) and across regulatory periods, they find that CAR in periods of
intensive regulation and enforcement (periods post-Levine et al. prosecutions), without
exception, are higher than in the other periods. All CAR are statistically significant at the
ten percent level or better. Similarly, comparisons of inter-period differences in
cumulative abnormal returns suggest that abnormal returns in later periods exceed those
in earlier ones (all values are statistically significant). However, few differences exist in
inter-period comparisons between periods of stringent regulations and periods where
insider trading is less regulated. Investigating the magnitude of excess volumes preceding
the announcement in each regulatory period, they find that excess preannouncement
volumes in target firms' shares persist in spite of increasing severe legislations and
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aggressive enforcement by the regulatory authorities (volume coefficients are positive
and statistically significant in every regulatory period).56 Inter-period volume
comparisons show that the net daily share volume rises across time except for the last
regulatory period where it slightly decreases. In general, evidence suggests that
preannouncement run-ups in target firm share prices are associated with run-ups in the
total volume of shares traded, which is, as previously seen, a contradiction with the fact
that registered insider trading volume prior to tender offer announcements has declined
with increasing stringent penalties and enforcement by regulatory authorities.
However, as Arshadi and Eyssell observes:
Unfortunately, these results so far are aggregated in the sense that they deal with total
returns and transactions volume. As such, they say little about who is (or is not)
engaging in preannouncement trading.57***

To determine the source in such inconsistency, the authors attempt to separate the
transactions of registered insiders from those of unregistered insiders. Their results show
that the increase in transactions volume over the period analyzed is not explained by
transactions from registered insiders at least in the three last regulatory periods. Arshadi
and Eyssell find the increase in informed transactions is due to unregistered insiders.
However, since insider trading by outside-insiders is almost impossible to observe
because they are not required to register their transactions, Arshadi and Eyssell have to
develop a series of tests to draw some inferences about the behavior of unregistered
insiders. These tests allow them to conclude that the existence of persistent patterns of
56
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preannouncement abnormal returns and increasing share volume despite regulatory
changes by the existence of outside insider trading.
Given the screening of their sample, first, they attribute a low likelihood to the
explanation advanced by Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter that preannouncement price and
volume increases may be the result of the workings of a perfectly legal market for
information.58
Second, they investigate a second possible explanation according to which
preannouncement price and volume increases may be the result of successful prediction
by market professionals acting on publicly available economic and financial information
that a given firm will become a takeover target. In order to test the robustness of this
assumption, they replicate Palepu's takeover prediction model and apply it to a portion of
their own sample.59
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developed by Palepu arises from his observation that 1970s studies claiming that acquisition targets can be
accurately predicted by models using public data are in contradiction with the observation that "the stock
market does not seem to predict acquisition targets with a high degree of accuracy even three months prior
to the announcement of takeover bids". He argues that this contradiction is explained by the fact that the
methodology used by the earlier acquisition studies suffers from "three principal methodological flaws,
which make their reported prediction accuracies unreliable". Palepu develops a takeover prediction model
that avoids these biases resulting from these methodological flaws. In his model, Palepu uses a probability
model (binomial logit model) "to specify the exact functional relationship between the firm characteristics
and its acquisition likelihood in a given period." The independent variables are selected on the basis of a set
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They find that the takeover prediction model could correctly identify only 42.9% of
actual targets as such and misclassified 31.7% of the non-target firms as targets. They
conclude that the explanatory power of the estimated model is quite small. Therefore,
Arshadi and Eyssell contend that the existence of persistent patterns of preannouncement
abnormal returns and increasing share volume despite regulatory changes cannot be
explained by successful predictions by market professionals acting on publicly available
economic and financial information.60
Pursuing their analysis of the hypothesis that takeover prediction may explain these
increases of preannouncement price and volume, CAR for each group for 250-day period
ending on the last of the prediction day are calculated in four portfolios: 1) all firms
predicted as targets by the model, 2) actual target firms correctly identified by the model,
3) all firms not predicted as targets by the model, and 4) actual targets not predicted as
such by the model. They argue that large CAR in actual target firms (38.75% for targets
of six hypotheses, "frequently suggested in the academic and/or popular financial literature, on the types of
firms that are likely to become acquisition targets." Instead of using a simple maximum likelihood (MLE)
procedure to estimate the model parameters and the state probabilities, he uses a conditional maximum
likelihood estimator (CMLE). The prediction ability of the model is tested on a large group of firms at a
given time in order to make the prediction test sample resemble the population as closely as possible.
Finally, instead of using an arbitrary cutoff probability of 0.5 as traditionally used in earlier acquisition
prediction studies, he uses the optimal cutoff probability to test the possibility of earning excess returns by
investing in potential targets identified by the model. His findings are that "while the estimated model is
found to be statistically significant, its explanatory power is quite small." He finds that "the estimated
model's ability to predict targets is not superior to that of the stock market." His conclusion is that the
model does not predict targets accurately.
60
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classified correctly and 40.84% for targets classified incorrectly) could only have been
predicted in possession of an accurate takeover prediction model, which is not the case
according to their previous robustness test of Palepu's model. As they explain, if one uses
Palepu's model to classify firms, only two portfolios will be used: 1) one group of
predicted targets and 2) one group of predicted non-target firms. When they calculate
excess returns in each portfolio (each portfolio includes both actual and misidentified
targets), CAR are -4.44% and -6.14% respectively for each portfolio. These results
confirm their previous conclusion (and Palepu's ones) that "the model does not provide
economically

useful

predictions"

and

that

observed

persistent

patterns

of

preannouncement excess returns through time cannot be explained by the use of a
takeover prediction model.61
Finally, to strengthen their theory that the use of inside information by outsideinsiders explains the existence of persistent patterns of preannouncement abnormal
returns and increasing share volume despite the increase in regulation, they investigate
inside-insider volume as a proportion of total daily share volume for each regulatory
period. As expected, the results show that net inside-insider purchases as a proportion of
total share volume fall over time (1.54% in the first regulatory period to -0.412% in the
last regulatory period). After the passage of ITSA (regulatory period 3), registered
insiders participate less prior to tender offer announcements. These results are consistent
with the hypothesis that increasing regulations have deterrent effects on registered
insider-trading activity. These latter results strongly enhance Arshadi and Eyssell's theory
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that outside-insider trading explains the existence of persistent patterns of abnormal
returns and increasing share volume in spite regulatory changes.
Their conclusions are consistent with Seyhun's. Increasingly stringent regulations and
a vigorous regulatory attitude by the SEC and Justice Department have significantly
altered registered insiders' behavior, particularly around corporate events which are
subject to greater scrutiny by the regulatory authorities.
However, as we argued above, this does not mean that insider trading per se has been
eliminated as the existence through time of persistent patterns of abnormal returns and
increasing share volume shows. Actually, it seems to have shifted from registered
insiders to unregistered insiders (outside-insiders). As Seyhun did, Arshadi and Eyssell
conclude that insider-trading regulation is overall ineffective in preventing trading on the
basis of inside information.62
Seyhun and Bradley investigate insider trading preceding corporate bankruptcy
announcements.63 Contrary to previous empirical studies64, they find that insiders do "bail
out" on their stockholders prior to filing a bankruptcy petition. Actually, it appears that
insiders begin to sell five years before the filing date and insiders' selling volume
increases up to the announcement month. Moreover, in contrast to their predecessors,
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Seyhun and Bradley look at the impact of regulatory changes on this type of insider
trading.65
They first observe that the securities of firms that file bankruptcy petitions suffer
significant losses in the years preceding the filing date. For example, in the second year
before filing, the price of their shares dropped an average of 17%. In the year before,
investors lost another 48% and in the month of filing, they lost another 28%. Over the 2year period before filing, the average cumulative loss amounts to 70%. Regarding the
average abnormal loss for each year during the four years before filing, they are
respectively 14%, 18%, 39%, and 66%. In the month of filing, the average abnormal loss
amounts to 30%. Over the five year period before the filing date, the average abnormal
loss reaches 206%.
When looking at registered insider trading prior to bankruptcy petition filing, Seyhun
and Bradley find that "insiders are significant net sellers of their firm's shares in the
months and years preceding a bankruptcy filing." They observe that, in the fifth year
before filing a bankruptcy petition, insider selling represents a total disinvestment of
$716,000 per firm. When compared with the fact that the returns to the stockholders of
these firms are significantly negative in the fourth year before filing, the data suggest that
"insiders possess privileged information regarding the future price of their firms'
securities".66 Moreover, they observe that the trading pattern by top executives and
officers shows that they have more information regarding their firms' future situation than
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other insiders. Top executives are net sellers in every period and officers are net sellers in
four of the five periods.
Investigating the relationship between the timing of insider trading and security
returns, Seyhun and Bradley find that insiders avoid the significant capital losses incurred
by stockholders of bankrupt firms in the years before filing the petition by selling before
the stock price declines and buying stock after prices have fallen.
After having investigated insider-trading timing and volume in bankrupt firms,
Seyhun and Bradley analyze the impact of regulatory changes in the laws governing
corporate bankruptcies and insider trading on these variables. Their observations are
consistent with Seyhun's observations in his previous studies on the impact of regulatory
changes on insider trading around major corporate events, which attract the scrutiny of
the regulatory authorities. While we observe that insider selling volume before the filing
increased despite an increasingly stringent legal environment, after the passage of the
ITSA in 1984 insiders became more reluctant to sell their holdings in the 30 days
preceding a filing. Since the passage of the ITSA, they find that "top executives have
reported literally no transactions in their firms' shares in the 30 days preceding a filing."
In other words, the increases in the level and enforcement of insider-trading regulations
did have an impact on insider-trading patterns, which manifest particularly by the fact
that insiders avoid trading around events being the object of great scrutiny by the
regulatory authorities. However, this does not mean that insider trading has disappeared,
as the data show; actually, insiders continue to trade in their own company securities.
Two general observations can be made regarding the effectiveness of insider-trading
regulations in deterring insiders from trading on the basis of inside information. First,

37

despite the increases in the level and enforcement of insider-trading prohibitions, insiders
continue to trade on the basis of inside information. The level of insider trading seems to
have dramatically increased. However, it appears that the increase of stringent penalties
and enforcement activities by the SEC and the Department of Justice, particularly against
insiders trading on the basis of nonpublic information related to major corporate events,
had had an impact on corporate insider-trading patterns. Corporate insiders do trade less
around major corporate events.
Second, while we do observe that these regulations had an impact on corporate
insider-trading patterns, insider trading per se has not been eliminated. Actually, these
regulations did nothing more than change the nature of insider trading; they have not
eliminated or even reduced it. As Seyhun shows, the nature of insider trading has
changed in the sense that (registered) insiders now trade more on inside information not
related to major corporate events or at times other than those subject to strict scrutiny by
regulators. Furthermore, as Arshadi and Eyssell show, the nature of insider trading has
changed in the sense that the vast majority of insider trading is not derived so much from
registered insiders whose transactions are under great scrutiny by the regulatory
authorities as from unregistered insiders (outside-insiders).
The empirical evidence seems to be consistent with our analysis of the impossibility
for the regulation of insider trading to be effective. In the facts, the regulation of insider
trading appears largely ineffective in preventing non-public information from circulating
in the markets essentially due to the intangible nature of the information.
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4 Conclusion
This contribution of this paper was to study whether regulation of insider trading can
be effective in deterring insiders from trading on non-public information. Our analysis
shows that it is in theory and practice impossible for insider trading regulation to be
effective. Because of the intangible nature of the information, insiders have a large
variety of ways to escape the regulation of insider trading. Actually, it appears as some of
the most recent findings in the empirical literature show that, despite the evolution and
increases in enforcement and level of insider trading prohibitions, insider trading and its
profitability have become more important. Therefore, we can argue that our analysis is
consistent with the empirical literature.
Our conclusions draw some important implications for further empirical research on
this issue such as attempting to develop a cost-benefit analysis of the regulation of insider
trading. Despite that the regulation of insider trading does not eliminate insider trading,
there may be some benefits such as increasing investors confidence, increasing market
liquidity, or reducing the cost of capital that result from such regulation. Therefore,
empirical research might also be done regarding whether such benefits outweigh the costs
of such a regulation.
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APPENDIX
Survey of the Empirical Literature Pertaining to Corporate Insider Trading and Analysis of Strength of Relationship between Insider Trading and
Other Factors and the Magnitude of Abnormal Returns Pertaining to Related Insider Activity
Panel A
Insider Trading Activity in Target Firms Around Takeover Announcements
Sample
Period

Issue Investigated

Keown and
Pinkerton
(1981)

1975-1978

Evaluation of insider activity in the
month before the first announcement
of a takeover.

Arshadi and
Eyssell
(1991)

Test null hypothesis that the passage of
ITSA had no effect on the actions of Examine the volume and profitability of
registered insiders. Preannouncement registered insider trading in target firms'
1975-1987
trading by registered insiders is at least shares before and after the passage of
the ITSA of 1984.
as prevalent subsequent to the passage
of the Act as it was before its passage.

Authors

Sanders and
Zdanowicz
(1992)

Seyhun
(1992)

1978-1986

Study examines average abnormal
returns, trading volume and reported
transactions of target firm insiders in
periods preceding takeover
announcements.

Evidence Measurement

Strength of Evidence

76% of the firms studied experienced
No evidence of rampant/frantic trading
no open market purchases or sales in
by corporate insiders of targets firms in
the month prior to the announcement
the month before takeover
date, and only 12% had net positive
announcements.
market purchases.

Test whether insiders change their
trading activity in the period before the
first public announcement of a takeover
bid (but after they have private
knowledge of the upcoming
announcement).

Evaluates (non-statistically) whether
large trading profits made by insiders
Looks briefly at insider activity before
were because of trading before takeover
1975-1989
takeovers
announcements (and/or earnings
surprises).
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Magnitude of Abnormal Returns

Average CAR of 25.27% for the
60 day period prior to the
announcement period.

Rejection of the null hypothesis that
CWAPE reaches 9.89% by the
the number of net purchases in the
week of the tender offer
event period is the same as in the
announcement in the pre-ITSA
estimation for the firm sample
sample. Strong reversal of this
(Computed test statistic Z = 3.24).
pattern of observed for the postACNT pre-ITSA = 1.81
ITSA sample. CWAPE reaches ACTN post-ITSA = - 1.67
10.78% by the announcement date.
(statistically insignificant)
They conclude that there is no
increase in purchasing during the
time when insiders are informed
about upcoming takeover
announcement.

Found that the proportion of takeover
announcements months (i.e. the 30
days preceding takeover
announcements) with insider
purchases ranges from 14.1% to
7.4% over the over three sub-periods.

Average CAR of 32.41% for the
60 day period prior to the
announcement (significant at the
0.01 level).

N/A

Panel B
Insider Trading Activity Before Bankruptcy Announcements
Loderer and
Sheehan
(1989)

Eyssell
(1991)

Gosnell,
Keown, and
Pinkerton
(1992)

1971-1985

Investigates whether insiders of
bankrupt firms hold less stock or
reduce their holdings compared to
what we observed for insiders of
similar firms that do not go bankrupt.

1975-1987

Investigates what insiders do before
bankruptcy's and before voluntary
liquidations.

1985-1987

Measure insider trading during the 31
month period surrounding the first
public announcement of a bankruptcy
filing of OTC firms.

No much evidence to support the idea
that these insiders do reduce their
holdings.

N/A

Uses a standardized measure of the net
The per firm average CAR of
Net number of purchases analysis
number of purchases (purchases – sales)
16.07% for the 36 months leading
shows significant differences
and also does Chi-Square test to look at
up to the announced voluntary
between the two periods (at the 0.01
differences between insider activity in
level for voluntary liquidation sample conversion. CAR of -39.04% for
the case of bankruptcy versus voluntary
the same period before a
and 0.01 level for the bankruptcy
liquidation using purchases and sales
bankruptcy.
sample).
separately.
Test using a control sample of firms and Find that insiders in firms that go
bankrupt do significantly (at the 0.01
the sample of bankrupt firms. The
level) more selling the 18-13 months
relative frequencies of buy and sell
and 6-1 months prior to the
transactions by insiders are compared
bankruptcy announcement..
between the two groups.

Mean losses avoided by insider
sellers of 27.55%.

Panel C
Insider Trading Activity Around Other Corporate News Events (e.g. Dividend Announcements)
Identification of relationship between
insider buying/selling and (1) a large
range of fundamental variables (e.g.
future earnings and future dividends)
and (2) firm characteristics (e.g. firm
size).

Weighted factor coefficients from a
linear discriminant function were used
to evaluate the difference among the
means of the factors.

Very strong evidence of the
relationship between insider trading
activity and the size (significant at
0.0000), earnings (significant at
0.0252) and dividends (significant at
0.0001).

Finnerty
(1976a)

1967-1972

Penman
(1982)

The direction of insider trading and
Evaluates relationship between insider
The relationship between the direction
Mean 3-day abnormal returns
magnitude of abnormal return in the
trading and the disclosure of
of the insider activity measures and the
ranged from 1.49% to 14.43% for
3 days around forecast date was
management earnings forecasts, and
magnitude of abnormal returns was
positive insider trading firms and
1967-1974 measures performance of the insiders
significant at the 0.05 level.
measured. Also, the magnitude of profits
from 1.3% to –9.00% for selling
Abnormal return associated with
who bought/sold before and
to the insiders for their trading was
firms.
trading activity was significant at the
sold/bought after positive/negative
measured.
0.0005 level.
management earnings forecasts.
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N/A

Moss and
Kohers
(1990)

p-values for the abnormal return to
Used the period from 2 to 60 days
Investigates whether insiders buy their
insiders for these cases were
before announcements of higher (at least
significant at levels ranging from
stock prior to favorable earnings and
10% different) than expected
1982-1983
dividend announcements and hence
0.036 (where earnings were less than
earnings/dividends and measured the
expected) to 0.000 (were less than
abnormal profits.
return to the insiders.
expected).

Allen and
Ramanan
(1990)

Paper examines the joint effects, both
additive and interactive of the surprise
1977-1981 in annual earnings announcements and
prior levels of insider trading
surrounding earnings announcements.

John and
Lang (1991)

Look at net measures of insider trading
1975-1985 activity as signaling that is relevant for
future dividend announcements.

Park, Jang,
and Loeb
(1995)

1986-1987

Investigate the trading behavior of
insiders surrounding the release of
earnings information.

ARs ranged from 34.71% when
dividends were greater than
expected to -350.89% when
dividends were less.

Three day abnormal returns
associated with each marginal
Used the trading activity in the 75 day trading classification were signed in
Insider purchase activity yielded 3
accordance with the expected
period(s) before earnings
day CAR of 1.38% on average.
implications of the signals (e.g.
announcements. Used ANCOVA to test
CAR during +2 to +20 day period
the main effect between trading activity positive trading would have positive
were 1.25%.
abnormal returns).
and earnings surprise.

Test using various regressions between
abnormal (excess) returns on/around
dividend announcement dates and
various insider trading measures.

Insider trading prior to the
announcement has significant
explanatory power for the returns
that are present on the dividend
announcement date.

1-day AR for the insider selling
group is about 2.2% less than group
with dividend announcements.

Found significant decreases in
Looked at changes in insider activity in purchasing activity before earnings
Mean abnormal profits to insiders
announcements, but there are
the period preceding EPS
who bought from -50 to -26 days
announcements.
significant increases in selling before
before earnings announcement of
bad news announcements.
Also investigated the actual profit (loss)
5.8%. Abnormal profits exceed 8%
earned by insiders after their
Differences between purchases and
for good news firms.
sales are highly significant in all
purchases/sales.
cases.

Study that does not appear in the original survey by Bettis, Duncan, and Harmon (1998).
Source: J. Carr Bettis, William A. Ducan, and W. Ken
Harmon, The Effectiveness of Insider Trading Regulations,
14 J. Applied Bus. Res. 53 (1998)
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